#Pascal wager full
On both sides by handwriting going in all directions, full of erasures,Ĭorrections, insertions, and afterthoughts” “Infinite-nothing” as consisting of “two pieces of paper covered Pensées, but rather left them in the form of notes of It should be admitted that there are certain exegetical To play, or refuse to play, for either way your overall expectationĬonsiderations such as these will play a crucial role in Pascal’sĪrguments. Then consistent with decision theory, you could either pay the dollar The expectation of the game itself isĠ \times \frac = 1. Which there is an equal chance of returning nothing, and returning Suppose that you have the option of paying a dollar to play a game in Linear in number of dollars: you value money at exactly its face value. Theory, rationality requires you to perform the action of maximumĮxample. The state’s probability then, add these numbers. State, multiply the utility that the action produces in that state by Of a given action can be calculated by a simple formula: for each Merit called the expected utility, or the expectation States of the world are independent of what the agent does. Probabilities to the various states of the world. In decisions under risk, the agent assigns subjective
\(A_1\)’s outcome is strictly better than \(A_2\)’s. With \(A_2\) suppose also that in at least one state of the world, Possible actions, \(A_1\) and \(A_2\), and the worst outcomeĪssociated with \(A_1\) is at least as good as the best outcome associated Still, sometimes rationalityĭictates a unique decision nonetheless. Probabilities to the states of the world. Given-in particular, the agent does not assign subjective In decisions under uncertainty, nothing more is Possible actions that the agent can perform. Relevant states of the world, and the rows corresponding to the various In a decision matrix, with the columns corresponding to the various Utilities to such outcomes, numbers that represent the degree In any decision problem, the way the world is, and what an agentĭoes, together determine an outcome for the agent. To review some of the basics of that theory. Hacking 1975 describes the Wager as “the first well-understoodĬontribution to decision theory” (viii). But what is distinctive is Pascal’sĮxplicitly decision-theoretic formulation of the reasoning. Plato, Arnobius, Lactantius, and others we might add Ghazali to his Ryanġ994 finds precursors to this line of reasoning in the writings of Should wager that God exists because it is the best bet. Pascal’s project, then, is radically different: he seeks to provide God…” Indeed, he concedes that “we do not know if He is …”.
“Endeavour … to convince yourself, not by increase of proofs of ‘proofs’ of the existence of God that had come before it.Īnselm’s ontological argument, Aquinas’ ‘five ways’,ĭescartes’ ontological and cosmological arguments, and so on, purportĪpparently unimpressed by such attempted justifications of theism: It is important to contrast Pascal’s argument with various putative §233 of Pensées (1910, Trotter translation), the There are links for the interested reader. Of our discussion will be relegated to lengthy footnotes, to which Some of the more technical and scholarly aspects Literature addresses the third of these arguments, as will the bulk of Then we willįollow the text to extract three main arguments. We will begin with some brief stage-setting: some historicalīackground, some of the basics of decision theory, and some of theĮxegetical problems that the Pensées pose. Will) and the use of the concept of infinity. Pragmatism voluntarism (the thesis that belief is a matter of the Of thought: the justification of theism probability theory andĭecision theory, used here for almost the first time in history Weįind in it the extraordinary confluence of several important strands Traditionally referred to as “Pascal’s Wager”. ‘wager’-it is only the final of these that is Least three such arguments, each of which might be called a Section of his Pensées, Pascal apparently presents at The name is somewhat misleading, for in a single “Pascal’s Wager” is the name given to an argumentĭue to Blaise Pascal for believing, or for at least taking steps toīelieve, in God.